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ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, EXPANDED JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, AND PREEMPTION – HALL STREET ASSOCIATES 
AND NAFTA TRADERS, INC. – A NATIONAL DEBATE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
J. KEATON GRUBBS* 
JUSTIN R. BLOUNT** 





On May 13, 2011, the Texas Supreme Court, in construing the Texas 
Arbitration Act, rejected the U. S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.1  At issue was whether the parties may by 
agreement expand judicial review of an arbitration award beyond the specific 
grounds for vacatur or modification set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.  
In NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn2 the Texas Supreme Court held that the 
Texas Arbitration Act does not preclude the parties from supplementing 
judicial review by contract. A discussion on the reasoning of the Texas Court 
and others that have addressed this issue, together with implications, is vital 
to moving forward with contractual arbitration domestically and 
internationally. 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) of 19253 prescribes the grounds 
for confirmation, vacatur, or modification of an arbitration award.  The 
statutory grounds are set forth in §§ 9, 10 and 11 of the FAA.4  In Hall Street 
Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the U. S. Supreme Court stated of these 
statutory grounds: 
 
Sections 10 and 11, after all, address egregious departures from the 
parties’ agreed-upon arbitration: “corruption,” “fraud,” “evident 
partiality,” “misconduct,” “misbehavior,” “exceed[ing] . . . 
powers,” “evident material miscalculation,” “evident material 
                                                 
 Received the "Best Article Award" for Volume XXIV of the Southern Law Journal. 
* M.B.A., J.D., Professor, Stephen F. Austin State University, Nacogdoches, TX. 
** M.B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor, Stephen F. Austin State University, Nacogdoches, TX. 
*** J.D., L.L.M., Assistant Professor, Stephen F. Austin State University, Nacogdoches, TX. 
1 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
2 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011). 
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. All references to the FAA are to these provisions. 
4 Id. §§ 9–11.  
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mistake,” “award[s] upon a matter not submitted;” the only ground 
with any softer focus is “imperfect[ions],” and a court may correct 
those only if they go to “[a] matter of form not affecting the 
merits.”5 
 
In addition, a non-statutory ground for vacating an arbitral award was 
developed in the courts as the doctrine of “manifest disregard.”  The doctrine 
arose in 1953 from language in Wilko v. Swan,6 where the Supreme Court 
stated, “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest 
disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in 
interpretation.”7  Generally, under the “manifest disregard” doctrine a court 
manifestly disregards the law when an arbitrator knows of a clear legal 
principle and refuses to apply it.8  In addition to “manifest disregard of the 
law,” the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a non-statutory 
ground based on “public policy.”9  
In Hall Street the U.S. Supreme Court ostensibly abolished all non-
statutory grounds for judicial review, including “manifest disregard” and 
“public policy,” and held that, “[t]he FAA’s grounds for prompt vacatur and 
modification of awards are exclusive for parties seeking expedited review 
under the FAA.”10  In reaching this conclusion, the Court suggested that 
“‘manifest disregard’ can be read as merely referring to the § 10 grounds 
collectively, rather than adding to them . . . or as shorthand for the § 10 
subsections authorizing vacatur when arbitrators were ‘guilty of misconduct’ 
or ‘exceeded their powers.’”11  
The Circuit courts were in conflict over the exclusiveness of the FAA 
provisions and the non-statutory doctrine of “manifest disregard” before 
Hall, and some still question whether “manifest disregard” survived the Hall 
Street decision.12  More importantly, the ruling in Hall Street is of great 
significance to arbitration as an ADR process.  Arbitration is a matter of 
contract between the parties, and parties typically provide for judicial review 
of the arbitral award in their agreement. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall 
Street precludes any such agreement, and now the statutory grounds for 
                                                 
5 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586. 
6 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). 
7 Id. (italics added). 
8 See Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 938-940 (2010); see generally 
Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above The Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Standard”, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011).  
9 See Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Services, Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2003). 
10 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 576-78. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 583-85.  See generally infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. 
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vacating or modifying an arbitration award under the FAA “are exclusive 
and cannot be supplemented by contract.”13  The Court went on to say, 
however, that: 
  
In holding that §§10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the 
review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they 
exclude more searching review based on authority outside the 
statute as well.  The FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate 
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, 
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.  But here we 
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under 
§§9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for 
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.14 
  
The larger issue then after Hall Street is whether and to what extent the 
parties to an arbitration agreement can provide for judicial review either 
beyond or narrower than the specific criteria in the FAA under the common 
law or a state arbitration act.  Furthermore, to what extent must all courts 
follow Hall Street in light of the preemption doctrine?  In Texas, these issues 
have been answered in Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.15  In that case, the Texas 
Supreme Court held that under the Texas General Arbitration Act (“TAA”) 
parties can indeed contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards 
and that such a conclusion is not preempted by the FAA or the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Hall Street.16  This ruling appears to create a conflict in the 
law of judicial review of arbitration awards, and the rulings in Nafta Traders 
and other cases leave significant uncertainty for parties to arbitration 
agreements.  Part II of this Article discusses and analyzes the rationale and 
ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Hall Street.  Part III discusses 
the aftermath of the Hall Street decision, particularly unanswered questions 
that remain after that ruling was issued.  Part IV discusses the rationale and 
ruling of the Texas Supreme Court in Nafta Traders as it resolved the Texas-
specific issues remaining after Hall Street.  Part V discusses the issue of 
preemption, and whether the result reached in Nafta Traders, as well as other 
state courts, should be preempted by the ruling in Hall Street.  Finally, Part V 
discusses and analyzes the practical implications of these differing rulings, 
and how knowledgeable counsel can deal with this conflict of law when 
drafting arbitration agreements.  
                                                 
13 Id. at 577-78, 585-88. (emphasis added.) 
14 Id. at 590-91. 
15339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011). 
16 Id. at 97. 




II. THE FAA AND HALL STREET ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. V. MATTEL, INC. 
 
The Hall Street litigation arose from a lease dispute between Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. (hereinafter “Hall Street”), which had leased property to 
Mattel, Inc. (hereinafter “Mattel”) for use as a manufacturing facility.17  The 
lease between the parties provided that Mattel would indemnify Hall Street 
for any costs incurred as a result of Mattel, or any predecessor tenants, failing 
to comply with environmental laws while operating manufacturing facilities 
on the property.18  A test was conducted in 1998 on the property’s well water, 
and high levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) were detected.19  The presence of 
TCE was believed to be the result of manufacturing discharge by tenants 
prior to Mattel, during the period between 1951 and 1980.20  An onsite 
property examination by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality 
(hereinafter DEQ), identified pollutants in the well water on the property.21  
As a result, Mattel ceased using well water and agreed to a consent order 
with the DEQ to commence cleanup of the site.22  In 2001, Mattel notified 
Hall Street of its intent to terminate the lease.23  In response, Hall Street filed 
suit challenging Mattel’s notice to terminate the lease, particularly claiming 
Mattel was obligated to indemnify Hall Street for cleanup costs incident to 
the removal of TCE and other pollutants from the property.24  Trial was held 
in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Oregon, and the trial court 
ruled in favor of Mattel on the termination issue; however, by agreement the 
parties agreed to submit the indemnification issue to arbitration.25  The 
parties prepared an arbitration agreement and the trial court approved the 
agreement.26  Specifically, the following provision was set forth in the 
arbitration agreement: 
 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon may 
enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or 
by vacating, modifying or correcting the award.  The Court shall 
vacate, modify or correct any award:  (i) where the arbitrator’s 
                                                 
17 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 579. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
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findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) 
where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.27 
 
At the conclusion of arbitration, Mattel received a favorable ruling, with 
a finding that it had no obligation to indemnify Hall Street.28  The arbitrator 
reasoned the lease directed Mattel to comply with all applicable federal, state 
and local environmental laws, but did not specifically require Mattel to 
comply with the testing requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality 
Act.29 
Hall Street then filed a motion to vacate, modify and/or correct the 
arbitrator’s decision in District Court, urging it was legal error not to 
consider the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act as an environmental law 
requiring Mattel’s compliance under the terms of the subject lease.30  The 
District Court agreed with Hall Street, vacated the arbitrator’s decision and 
remanded the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings.31  On remand, 
the arbitrator ruled in favor of Hall Street, concluding that the Oregon 
Drinking Water Quality Act did constitute an environmental law under the 
lease.32  Thereafter, both parties sought to modify portions of the arbitrator’s 
decision in District Court; however, the arbitrator’s ruling on indemnification 
in favor of Hall Street was upheld.33 
Both parties then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.34  The 
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Mattel, instructing the District Court on 
remand to “‘return to the application to confirm the original arbitration award 
(not the subsequent award revised after reversal), and . . . confirm that award, 
unless . . . the award should be vacated on the grounds allowable under 9 
U.S.C. Section 10, or modified or corrected under the grounds allowable 
under 9 U.S.C. Section 11.’”35 
On remand, the District Court ruled in favor of Hall Street.36  Following 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed again.37  The United States Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari on the issue of whether the grounds for vacatur and 
modification are exclusively identified in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.38    
                                                 
27 Id. 








36 Id. at 581. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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As stated above, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision held that the 
grounds stated in the FAA §§ 10 and 11 for either vacating, or modifying or 
correcting an arbitration award constitute the exclusive grounds for expedited 
vacatur and modification of an arbitration award pursuant to the FAA.39  The 
majority opinion written by Justice Souter first recited the national policy 
favoring arbitration and specific provisions of §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA 
and also referenced the split in the Circuits over exclusivity and expansion by 
agreement.40 The Court then proceeded to analyze Hall Street’s two main 
arguments against exclusivity or in favor of expansion by agreement, which 
were (i) that expandable judicial review authority has been accepted as the 
law since Wilko v. Swan”41 and (ii) “that the agreement to review for legal 
error ought to prevail simply because arbitration is a creature of contract, and 
the FAA is ‘motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to 
enforce agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered.’”42 The Court 
generally took a narrow, strict view of the FAA language in § 9, noting that 
“[u]nder the terms of § 9, a court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award 
‘unless’ it is vacated, modified, or corrected ‘as prescribed’ in §§ 10 and 
11.”43   
On Hall Street’s first position, the Court stated that the “supposed” 
expansion by judicial interpretation of the Wilko language on the part of the 
various courts “is too much for Wilko to bear.”44 Rather, the Court ruled that 
Wilko stood against general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors, and the 
language with the term “manifest disregard” may have been intended for a 
new ground, may merely have referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, or 
may have been a shorthand for the terms “guilty of misconduct” or 
“exceeded their powers” from the statutory language of the FAA.45  
However, the Court found “no reason to accord it the significance that Hall 
Street urges,” and ruled that the presence of this language in Wilko did not 
mean that private parties could contract for greater judicial review that than 
provided in the statute.46  
On Hall Street’s second position, the Court also ruled that the argument 
fell short.  The Court agreed that the FAA: 
 
lets parties tailor some, even many features of arbitration by 
contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what their 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 581-84. 
41 Id. at 584. 
42 Id. at 585. 
43 Id. at 582. 
44 Id. at 585. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
Spring 2014/Grubbs, et al./7 
 
 
qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with 
procedure and choice of substantive law. But to rest this case on the 
general policy of treating arbitration agreements as enforceable as 
such would be to beg the question, which is whether the FAA has 
textual features at odds with enforcing a contract to expand judicial 
review following the arbitration.  
To that particular question we think the answer is yes, that the 
text compels a reading of §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive.47  
 
The Court based its reasoning on statutory interpretation, including 
reference to the old canon of construction ejusdem generis, which states that 
in interpreting a statute, a general term is limited to or confined to coverage 
of the specific terms it follows.48  The Court noted that the statutory sections 
at issue did not even provide for “a textual hook for expansion” or a general 
term to allow judicial expansion of the enumerated specific instances of 
outrageous conduct to include “just any legal error.”49  The Court went on to 
say that expanding the detailed categories goes against the clear language and 
mandate of § 9, and Congress’ use of words such as “must grant” and 
“prescribed” “does not sound remotely like a provision meant to tell a court 
what to do just in case the parties say nothing else.”50 This led the Court to 
the ultimate conclusion that: 
 
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three 
provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring 
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain 
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.  
Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and 
evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely a 
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review 
process,” . . . and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration 
process.51 
 
Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in a dissenting opinion which 
focused on the FAA core purpose expressed in § 2 of the FAA “‘to abrogate 
the common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbitration 
agreements’”52 and to ensure “‘that private arbitration agreements are 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 586. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 587. 
51 Id. at 588 (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 593 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984)). 
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enforced according to their terms.’”53  Justice Stevens argued that the 
majority result conflicts with the FAA purpose and the statutory text does not 
compel a reading or interpretation inconsistent with the overriding interest of 
the FAA “in effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting 
parties.”54 He further argued that the majority’s decision was based in part on 
“an assumption that Congress intended to include the words ‘and no other’ in 
the grounds specified in §§ 10 and 11 for the vacatur and modification of 
awards.”55 
 
III. THE HALL STREET AFTERMATH – SCOPE AND 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
Much controversy has surrounded the Hall Street decision.  The courts 
at the federal and state levels as well as commentators have joined the 
debate.  Two highly regarded commentators, Professor Rau at the University 
of Texas and Professor Smit at Columbia University, critically reviewed the 
opinion and differed on the correctness of the decision.56  Professor Rau 
disagreed with the decision and reasoning,57 while Professor Smit agreed 
with the decision but found fault in the Court’s rationale for the holding and 
the unanswered questions it raised.58  The courts are in no less disarray.  
What seems clear from the holding in Hall Street is that the grounds in 
the FAA for vacatur, modification, or correction for judicial review of an 
arbitral award rendered solely pursuant to the FAA are exclusive and may 
not be expanded by the parties in an arbitration agreement.  This ostensibly 
laid to rest the general question and conflict over whether parties could 
expand arbitral award judicial review by contract under the FAA.  However, 
the Court’s treatment of “manifest disregard;” the Court’s qualification of the 
decision as only applying to FAA judicial review; and the Court’s statement 
that other means to judicial review outside the FAA may exist, such as state 
                                                 
53 Id. (quoting Volt Information Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 478, (1989)). 
54 Id. at 595 (stating that “A listing of grounds that must always be available to contracting 
parties simply does not speak to the question whether they may agree to additional grounds for 
judicial review.”). 
55 Id. at 594.  
56 See Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom,  17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (Special Section: Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.) 469 (2008); Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A 
Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (Special Section: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc.) 513 (2008). 
57 See Rau, supra note 56. 
58 See Smit, supra note 56. 
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statutes and common law, have led to what one commentator refers to as 
“The Hall Street Hangover.”59  
Generally, the FAA provisions and the court-developed common law 
doctrines for judicial review of arbitral awards have co-existed since the 
FAA enactment in 1925.60  The non-statutory vacatur doctrines have 
included “manifest disregard,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “completely 
irrational,” and “violation of public policy.”61  Other arguments outside of 
the FAA but finding effect in the courts have included, “contained a factual 
error,” “did not draw their essence from the agreement,” “had a punitive, 
excessive, or unauthorized remedy,” “were unconstitutional,” “were invalid 
because there was no arbitration agreement,” and “resulted from an 
agreement to allow parties to expand and define their own standards of 
review.”62  Thus, it was not unusual for courts to find extra-statutory bases 
for review outside of the arbitration agreement, or to allow parties to contract 
for a different standard of review for awards than that expressly set forth in 
the FAA. 
The Hall Street decision did not specifically say that all non-statutory, 
common law, or contractual avenues for judicial review were abolished, 
rendered null, or extinguished by its decision.  Rather, the Court stated: 
 
In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the 
review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they 
exclude more searching review based on authority outside the 
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into the court for 
parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate 
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, 
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.  But here we 
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§ 
9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for 
judicial enforcement or arbitration awards.63 
 
The most widely applied non-statutory standard in both federal and state 
courts is “manifest disregard.”64  At least one view is that “manifest 
                                                 
59 See Codie Henderson, Note, Business Law—The Hall Street Hangover: Recovering and 
Discovering Avenues for Review of Arbitration Awards; Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 
128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008), 10 WYO. L. REV. 299 (2010). 
60 See LeRoy, supra note 8; see also Weston, supra note 8; Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905 (2010). 
61 Leroy, supra note 8, at 174. 
62 Id. at 174-75. 
63 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008). 
64 See generally Leroy, supra note 8 (setting forth research regarding the adoption of the 
manifest disregard standard). 
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disregard” has subsumed all non-statutory, common law grounds, except 
perhaps “public policy.”65  Prior to Hall Street, all federal Circuit Courts had 
adopted the “manifest disregard” ground as a possible basis for vacating an 
arbitral award.  The three possible sources for the courts’ understanding and 
applying this ground have been: 
 
1. As an independent, judicially created ground for review of 
arbitration awards; 
2. As a turn of phrase used in interpreting the §10 grounds for vacating 
an award; and 
3. As a synonym for FAA §10(a)(4) allowing vacatur where an 
arbitrator “exceeded their powers.”66 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed “manifest disregard” specifically in 
the Hall Street opinion, referring to the Wilko v. Swan case and language that 
gave rise to the doctrine and further acknowledging the differences between 
the Federal Circuit Courts regarding whether it is an independent ground for 
review or a shorthand for certain statutory grounds.  The Court stated:  
 
Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new 
ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the §10 grounds 
collectively, rather than adding to them  . . .  Or, as some courts 
have thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for § 
10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the 
arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their 
powers.”67  
 
The Federal Circuit Courts are now divided on whether “manifest 
disregard,” in particular, or any other non-statutory, common law ground 
survives the Hall Street decision.68  There are three ways the federal and state 
courts have decided the issue since Hall Street: 
 
1. The FAA grounds in § 10 are exclusive, and Hall Street abolished 
“manifest disregard” as an independent ground for judicial review – 
so the doctrine is eliminated and no longer available or applicable; 
2. “Manifest disregard” is a “judicial gloss” for all of the § 10 grounds 
for vacatur – so the court could still apply existing precedent as long 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 160-73; Weston, supra note 8, at 941-45. 
67 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585. 
68 Leroy, supra note 8, at 180. 
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as the reasoning did not extend beyond one of the enumerated 
grounds; and 
3. “Manifest disregard” is shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4) – so 
that the court could still apply existing precedent to it as a statutory 
ground.69 
 
The breakdown of the split between the Federal Circuit Courts reflects 
that the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the “abolished” line of 
reasoning.70  The Second Circuit continues to apply the doctrine under the 
“judicial gloss” reasoning.71  The Ninth Circuit continues to apply the 
doctrine under the “shorthand” reasoning.72  The First, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits have expressed hints or views in dicta or unpublished opinions but 
have not directly addressed and expressed their positions.73  The remaining 
Third, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have not yet written on the 
question.74  
The state courts that have addressed the question of contractual judicial 
expansion and a non-statutory or common law ground, particularly “manifest 
disregard,” are also divided on approach.  The Alabama Supreme Court has 
adopted the “abolished” position and supplemental grounds are no longer 
applicable.75  Colorado questions the applicability of any non-statutory bases 
after Hall Street.76  California, Wisconsin, and Indiana courts have ruled or 
assumed that “manifest disregard” still survives under one or the other of the 
above approaches.77  In May 2011, Texas addressed the issue of contractual 
agreements to expand judicial review in the Nafta Traders decision. 
 
IV. THE TAA AND NAFTA TRADERS, INC. V. QUINN 
 
In May, 2011, the Texas Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.78  The Court directly addressed the holding in 
Hall Street in light of the TAA.79 The TAA provides for confirming, vacatur, 







75 Volvo Trucks N.A., Inc. v. Dolphin Line, Inc., 50 So.3d 1050 (Ala. 2010). 
76 Barnett v. Elite Props., No. 09CA0693, 2010 WL 2105940, at *6 (Colo. App. May 27, 
2010). 
77 Leroy, supra note 8, at 181. 
78 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011). 
79 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 171.001 - .098. All references to the TAA are to 
these provisions. 
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and modification of arbitral awards on grounds nearly identical to those in §§ 
10 and 11 of the FAA.  The provision of the TAA that corresponds to § 9 in 
the FAA states that “[u]nless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or 
correcting an award under section 171.088 or 171.091 [of the TAA], the 
court, on application of a party, shall confirm the award.”80  Applying the 
TAA, the Texas Supreme Court reached a different conclusion than the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Hall Street, and in rejecting Hall Street the Texas high 
court decided that the criteria in the TAA were not exclusive and the parties 
could supplement judicial review in the arbitration agreement.81 
Prior to the litigation leading to the decision in Nafta Traders, Margaret 
Quinn (“Quinn”) was Vice President of Operations for Nafta Traders, Inc. 
(“Nafta Traders”), an international re-distributor of athletic apparel and 
footwear.82  Quinn was terminated by Nafta Traders when the company 
reduced its workforce in response to declining business.83  Quinn sued Nafta 
Traders, alleging her termination was motivated by sex discrimination.84  The 
handbook for employees of Nafta Traders required binding arbitration to 
resolve disputes arising incident to the employment relationship; however, 
the handbook did not specify whether state or federal law would apply.85  
Nafta Traders responded to Quinn’s lawsuit by moving to compel arbitration 
under the Federal Arbitration Act.86  Quinn did not object, and an agreed 
order was signed directing the parties to arbitration.87 
Following arbitration, Quinn received an award of $30,000 in back pay, 
$30,000 in mental anguish damages, $29,031 in “special damages,” $104,828 
in attorney fees, and costs.88  Quinn filed a motion to confirm the arbitration 
decision under the TAA.89  In response, Nafta Traders moved for vacatur 
under the FAA, the TAA, common law, and a section captioned 
“Arbitration” of the Nafta Traders’ employee handbook, which provided in 
relevant part: 
 
The arbitrator does not have authority (i) to render a decision which 
contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a 
                                                 
80 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.087. 
81 Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 101 (Tex. 2011). 
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cause of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing 
state or federal law.90 
 
Nafta Traders argued that the agreement on the limitations of the 
arbitrator’s authority effectively expanded the narrow scope of judicial 
review otherwise allowed by the TAA and FAA.91  As specific grounds for 
vacatur, Nafta Traders contended that (i) the arbitrator improperly applied 
federal sex discrimination law to Quinn’s claim, although she had only 
alleged violation of state law; (ii) the evidence was factually insufficient to 
support a finding of sex discrimination; (iii) the attorneys fee award was 
improper; (iv) the “special damages” award was a double recovery of lost 
wages; and (v) the evidence did not support a recovery of mental anguish 
damages.92  The District Court confirmed the arbitrator’s award without 
comment on Nafta Traders’ complaints and Nafta Traders appealed.93  The 
Dallas Court of Appeals applied the TAA rather than the FAA, but decided 
that the similarity of the two statutes justified construing the TAA like the 
U.S. Supreme Court construed the FAA in Hall Street.94  The Dallas Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling that “‘parties seeking judicial review 
of an arbitration award covered under the TAA cannot contractually agree to 
expand the scope of that review and are instead limited to judicial review 
based on the statutory grounds enumerated in the statute.’”95  
Nafta Traders also argued in the Court of Appeals that the arbitrator 
exceeded his power by issuing an erroneous award when the arbitration 
agreement expressly denied his authority to commit reversible error or apply 
an action or remedy contrary to state or federal law.96  The argument 
implicated a statutory ground in section 171.088(a)(3)(A) of the TAA.97  The 
Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the argument by saying that an arbitrator 
exceeds his power by deciding issues not submitted to arbitration but not by 
deciding submitted issues erroneously.98  The Court further expressed that 
Nafta Traders was trying to invoke the ground to accomplish indirectly what 
Hall Street already determined Nafta Traders could not do directly, that is 
                                                 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 88-89. 
94 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street after oral argument in Nafta Traders but 
before the Texas Court of Appeals’ opinion was issued. 
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expand judicial review by contract.99  The Court concluded that none of 
Nafta Traders’ arguments fell within a statutory ground.100 
Nafta appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, and Justice Hecht delivered 
the opinion of the Court.  In a 9-0 decision, the Court addressed two principal 
questions: whether the TAA, like the FAA (as decided in Hall Street), 
“precludes an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for 
reversible error, and if not, whether the FAA preempts enforcement of such 
an agreement.”101  The Court answered both in the negative and reversed the 
Court of Appeals.102  
On the first issue, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that it must 
follow Hall Street in applying the FAA, but the Court stated that it would 
make its own judgment in construing the TAA.103  The Court’s rationale 
began with the specific ground for vacatur or modification of an award found 
in the TAA, that “the arbitrators … exceeded their powers.”104  Furthermore, 
the Court noted that “‘[a]n arbitrator derives his power from the parties’ 
agreement to submit to arbitration.’”105 The Texas Supreme Court quoted the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp,106 as follows: 
 
Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an 
arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give effect to the 
contractual rights and expectations of the parties.  In this endeavor, 
as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.  This is 
because an arbitrator derives his or her powers from the parties’ 
agreement to forgo the legal process and submit their disputes to 
private dispute resolution.107 
 
Quinn argued that the agreement limiting the arbitrator’s authority was 
in effect broadening judicial review of the arbitration award just like the 
agreement in Hall Street.108  She argued that this is not permitted under the 
TAA for the same reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court recited in Hall Street 
regarding the FAA.109  The Texas Supreme Court noted that the U.S. 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 87. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.088(a)(3)(A). 
105 Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 91 (quoting In re Gulf Exploration, LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 
839 (Tex. 2009)). 
106 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1773-74 (2010). 
107 Id. 
108 Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d. at 91 (Tex. 2011). 
109 Id. 
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Supreme Court based its decision on the textual framework of the FAA and 
the policy favoring limited review expressed in the FAA’s statutory 
language110 and that the parties and the Court in Hall Street framed the issue 
as “expandable judicial review authority.”111 However, the Texas Supreme 
Court viewed the agreement in Nafta Traders as the “flip-side” to such a 
frame, “limited arbitral decision-making authority.”112  
Even though the parties in Hall Street did not couch their agreement in 
the specific terms of limited authority in an award that was not supported by 
the law, that was the practical effect of what they were attempting to do.  The 
Hall Street parties were therefore attempting to do indirectly what the Nafta 
Traders parties were doing directly – limit the arbitrator’s authority.113  In 
Hall Street, the U.S. Supreme Court did not discuss FAA § 10(a)(4), which 
provides for vacatur for an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers like the 
TAA provision in § 171.088(a)(3)(A).  The Texas Supreme Court held that 
this section undercuts the U.S. Supreme Court’s textual analysis,114 reasoning 
that if the parties agree that the arbitrator’s authority shall be limited to that 
of a judge to not reach a decision based on reversible error, “in other words, 
that an arbitrator should have no more power than a judge,” then a motion to 
vacate for exceeding that authority is “firmly grounded in the text of Section 
10.”115  According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning, an arbitrator can 
never exceed his or her power by committing reversible error within § 10, 
regardless of the parties’ agreement.  Whether this reasoning is “at odds with 
expanded judicial review depends on whether the right to contract to 
circumscribe arbitral authority includes limiting the authority to err in 
decision-making.”116 According to the Texas Supreme Court, the ultimate 
question was “whether parties can agree to limit an arbitrator’s power to 
err.”117  
The Texas Supreme Court proceeded to discuss the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s policy declarations for the FAA in Hall Street, predominantly 
“limited review” and “resolving disputes straightaway” – couched as 
expeditious resolution of claims.118 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this 
reasoning and cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s own repeated affirmations that 
“the principal purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private arbitration 
                                                 
110 Id. at 92. 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 93. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 94. 
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agreements are enforced according to their terms.”119  A policy of limited 
judicial review in an agreement would be inimical to such purpose as well as 
the “national policy favoring arbitration” established by Congress in the 
FAA.120 
According to the Texas Supreme Court’s rationale, searching for a 
policy rationale to the Hall Street reasoning was unavailing, so the 
consideration came back to the statutory text, and the Court stated: 
 
The problem comes down to this. Under the TAA (and the FAA), 
an arbitration award must be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds his 
powers. Generally, an arbitrator’s powers are determined by 
agreement of the parties.  Can the parties agree that an arbitrator 
has no more power than a judge, so that his decision is subject to 
review, the same as a judicial decision?  Hall Street answers no, 
based on an analysis of the FAA’s text that ignores the provision 
that raises the problem, and a policy that may the at odds with the 
national policy favoring arbitration.  With great respect, we are 
unable to conclude that Hall Street’s analysis of the FAA provides 
a persuasive basis for construing the TAA the same way. 
[W]e agree that delay and resulting expense are concerns that 
arbitration is intended, at least, to alleviate.  But equally grievous is 
a post-arbitration process that refuses to correct errors as the parties 
intended, and of equal concern is a civil justice system that allows 
parties an alternative to litigation only if they are willing to risk an 
unreviewable decision. 121  
 
The Texas Supreme Court went on to reaffirm Texas policy and law adhering 
to broad freedom of contract and found nothing in the TAA conflicting with 
the policy, stating: 
 
On the contrary, the purpose of the TAA is to facilitate arbitration 
agreements. . . . Specifically, the TAA contains no policy against 
parties’ agreeing to limit the authority of an arbitrator to that of a 
judge, but rather, an express provision requiring vacatur when 
“arbitrators [have] exceeded their powers.” . . . Accordingly, we 
hold that the TAA presents no impediment to an agreement that 
limits the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus 
                                                 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 95 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)). 
121 Id. at 95 (footnotes omitted). 
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allows for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible 
error.122 
 
The Texas Court thus declined to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning 
from Hall Street and held that the TAA did not preclude an arbitration 
agreement from limiting the arbitrator’s authority in deciding a matter and 




A. The Preemption Ruling in Nafta Traders 
 
The second broad question addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in 
Nafta Traders was whether its decision and accompanying rule for the TAA 
was preempted by the FAA and the contrary holding in Hall Street.  The 
agreement in NAFTA Traders was covered by both state and federal law, 
since the parties did not specifically choose one or the other.  When both 
laws apply, the Texas Supreme Court held that “state law is preempted ‘to 
the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law – that is, to the extent that 
it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”124  Thus, the Texas Supreme Court 
held that because the provision for expanded judicial review did not directly 
conflict with the federal policy of enforcing arbitration clauses enshrined in 
the FAA, it was not preempted.125  
The Texas Supreme Court relied extensively on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s explanation of the FAA’s preemptive effect in Volt Info. Sciences, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.126  In Volt, the parties 
chose California law to govern their arbitration agreement.127  The California 
law contained a provision that allowed a stay of arbitration pending 
resolution of related litigation,128 while the FAA contained no such 
provision.129  As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state law was 
not preempted, concluding that the FAA’s purpose is not defeated by 
conducting arbitration under state-law procedures different from the federal 
                                                 
122 Id. at 97. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted). 
125 Id. 
126 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
127 Id. at 470. 
128 Id. at 471. 
129 Id. at 472. 
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statute.130  The Texas Supreme Court seized upon the following language in 
that case:  
 
While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage 
the expeditious resolution of disputes, its passage “was motivated, 
first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements 
into which parties had entered.” Accordingly, we have recognized 
that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have 
not agreed to do so, . . . nor does it prevent parties who do agree to 
arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the scope of their 
arbitration agreement. It simply requires courts to enforce privately 
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in 
accordance with their terms.131 
 
The Texas Supreme Court construed the language to mean that “FAA-
preemption is aimed at state-law hindrances to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements not applicable to contracts generally.”132  Specifically, the court 
held that: 
 
The FAA only preempts the TAA if: (1) the agreement is in 
writing, (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it can withstand 
scrutiny under traditional contract defenses under state law, and (4) 
state law affects the enforceability of the agreement. . . . The mere 
fact that a contract affects interstate commerce, thus triggering the 
FAA, does not preclude enforcement under the TAA as well. For 
the FAA to preempt the TAA, state law must refuse to enforce an 
arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because 
(1) the TAA has expressly exempted the agreement from coverage, 
or (2) the TAA has imposed an enforceability requirement not 
found in the FAA.133  
 
The lesson from Volt, according to the Texas Supreme Court is “that the 
FAA does not preempt all state-law impediments to arbitration; it preempts 
state-law impediments to arbitration agreements.”134  In light of Volt, the 
Texas Supreme Court did not read the Hall Street opinion as displacing the 
principal basis of preemption as protection of parties’ arbitration agreements.  
                                                 
130 Id. at 478-79. 
131 Id. at 478 (citations omitted). 
132 Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 98 (Tex. 2011). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 100. 
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This is particularly true in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in 
Hall Street, which states:  
 
In holding that [FAA] §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for 
the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that 
they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the 
statute as well.  The FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate 
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, 
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.  But here we 
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§ 
9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for 
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.135  
 
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court’s construction of the TAA that 
allows agreements to enlarge judicial review is not an impediment to the 
enforcement of the parties’ agreement, but rather advances the enforcement 
of the agreement according to the intentions and expectations of the parties.  
In addition, the Hall Street opinion expressly contemplates that the FAA will 
not preempt state law allowing expanded judicial review.  
The Texas Supreme Court did not stop with the answering of the two 
primary questions.  After determining that the TAA allowed expanded 
judicial review by agreement and that the TAA was not preempted by the 
FAA in this regard, the Texas Supreme Court concluded the opinion with 
qualifications and caveats. Mere choice of the TAA to govern the agreement 
or specifically choosing not to be governed by the FAA does not provide 
expanded judicial review.  “The matter is left to the agreement of the parties. 
. . . [A]bsent clear agreement, the default under the TAA, and the only course 
permitted by the FAA, is restricted judicial review.”136 Furthermore, a mere 
agreement for expanded judicial review is in itself not enough. The parties 
must ensure a sufficient record of the proceedings and complaints must have 
been preserved as if the award was a judgment going up on appeal.  
Additionally, the parties may not agree to a different standard of review than 
would be applicable to a judicial appeal.137 
 
B. Preemption Issues Going Forward 
 
Open preemption issues remain with respect to the scope of judicial 
review of arbitration awards.  Will the conclusion of the Texas Supreme 
                                                 
135 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008). 
136 Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 101. 
137 Id. at 101-02. 
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Court on the issue of preemption be followed by the U.S. Supreme Court?  
Will choice of law provisions where parties specifically choose state 
arbitration law as the basis for judicial review of an award be followed, or 
will they be preempted by federal law?  Do FAA §§ 9-11 apply exclusively 
in federal courts, but not in state courts?  The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on these specific preemption issues and its previous rulings on 
preemption and the FAA have been somewhat confusing and conflicting, 
making it difficult to determine how these issues will be resolved.  While the 
language in Hall Street indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court may be open to 
the preemption reasoning utilized in Nafta Traders allowing expanded 
judicial review, the method of statutory construction used by the Court in 
Hall Street can easily lead to the opposite conclusion – that expanded judicial 
review is preempted, in both state and federal court, if the arbitration at issue 
is subject to the FAA.  
In Hall Street, the U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily, and almost 
exclusively, upon the text of the statute itself in reaching its conclusion.  The 
text of the particular sections of the FAA at issue can be interpreted as an 
indicator of express Congressional intent to preempt state law and establish a 
national standard for both state and federal courts reviewing arbitration 
awards: 
 
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the 
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the 
arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one 
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply 
to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and 
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is 
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 
of this title.138  
 
Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court did give credence to the fact that 
more expansive judicial review under state statutes was “arguable,”139 their 
own method of strict and literal construction of the statutory language would 
seem to eliminate that argument.  The language of this provision, taken at 
face value, appears to expressly state that all arbitration awards covered by 
the FAA may only be modified, corrected, or vacated as set forth in the FAA.  
There is no indication in this provision of intent to allow an applicable state 
statute or the common law to undercut this policy.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has not yet addressed whether §§ 9-11 of the FAA apply to state courts.140  
                                                 
138 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). 
139 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588. 
140 See Drahozal, supra note 60, at 924. 
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Some commentators have asserted that by their terms, these provisions 
should be interpreted as applying only to federal courts, and have no, or very 
limited, applicability to FAA cases in state court.141  However, a strict 
reading of the statute does not support such a conclusion.  
Section 9 of the FAA does not refer only to judicial review by federal 
courts, it refers to any court that the parties specify, and then proceeds to 
state that any such court “must grant” an order confirming the award, except 
for the reasons set forth in §§ 10 & 11.  Thus, while FAA §§ 10 and 11 
specifically reference only federal courts,142 they are incorporated by 
reference in § 9, which applies those sections to any court specified by the 
parties.143  If the U.S. Supreme Court continues to construe this provision as 
literally as it did in Hall Street, then it would appear that the proper 
interpretation of this provision is that it requires any court, not just federal 
courts, specified by the parties to enter a judgment confirming the award 
unless the statutory reasons for vacatur or modification are met.  If this 
language is as mandatory and dogmatic as the Hall Street opinion makes it 
out to be, any state arbitration statute which allows for more expansive 
judicial review is in direct conflict with this statutory language and is 
arguably preempted if the FAA also applies to the arbitration agreement at 
issue. 
Indeed, language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street would 
seem to support such an approach.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
stated that §§ 9-11 of the FAA set forth a “national policy favoring 
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”144  If the standard of 
judicial review of an arbitration award can be modified simply by seeking 
enforcement under a state statute that allows a lower standard of review, such 
a “national policy” could hardly be fulfilled.     
                                                 
141 Id. (“If sections 9 and 10 of the FAA apply in their entirety in state court, their preemptive 
effect presumably is the same as described above—precluding reliance on state laws 
permitting expanded review.  But the more likely result is that sections 9 and 10 of the FAA 
do not apply in state court—that, consistent with their terms, they apply only in federal 
court.”) (citing 4 Ian R. Mcneil, Richard E. Speidel & Thomas J. Stipanowich, Federal 
Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards, and Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act §§ 
38.1.4-6 (Supp. 1999) (“[w]ith one exception, the courts in which FAA §§ 9-11 proceedings 
are to take place were obviously intended by Congress to be federal, not state, courts.  The one 
exception is under FAA §9, where the parties have the power to and do specify a court for 
confirmation, with nothing in the section explicitly limiting their power of selection to federal 
courts.  Thus, for example, a clause providing for entry of judgment in a New York state court 
would appear to be effective under FAA § 9.”). 
142 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 & 11. 
143 9 U.S.C. § 9.   
144 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588.   
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The only exception one could arguably find in the language of the 
statute is that it expressly refers only to courts which the parties have 
specified in their agreement.145  The language of this provision is not limited 
to federal courts.  This is clear from the fact that the provision later expressly 
discusses that if no such election is made by the parties, then application for 
enforcement of an award can be made to a federal court.146  Thus, while FAA 
§ 9 clearly applies to state courts, it can be argued to apply only to state 
courts specified by the parties in the arbitration agreement.  If this is truly 
what the statute says, then the results from such an interpretation are quite 
bizarre.  Parties wishing to contract for expanded judicial review under state 
law would essentially be penalized for using a forum selection clause.   
If the parties to the agreement contract for a specific state’s standard of 
judicial review to apply but do not include a forum selection clause, then 
they would have the opportunity for expanded judicial review, but only if 
there was no basis for removal to federal court.  If the case is removed to 
federal court, and if § 9 of the FAA means what its text appears to mean, 
then the federal court is bound to apply the exclusive standard of judicial 
review found in §§ 10-11.  However, if the parties utilize a forum selection 
clause which states the award may only be enforced in a particular state 
court, the result under § 9 would be that by specifically choosing a state 
court, you have essentially contracted for the exclusive federal court standard 
of review.  Under such a strict interpretation of § 9, the only time the parties 
could have the standard of judicial review that they desire is when they 
contract for a specific state law to apply, fail to contract for a specific state 
forum, and there is no basis for federal court jurisdiction.  Such a result 
seems nonsensical, and obviously does not fulfill the federal policy of 
ensuring “the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements 
to operate.”147   
Following the rigid statutory interpretation utilized in Hall Street would 
appear to indicate that the above result is correct.  If the text of FAA § 9 is to 
be strictly applied, then it is difficult to reach another result.  The only 
arguments that remain are that either Congress did not really mean that § 9 
applies only to state courts when the parties specifically name the court, but 
applies to all cases governed by the FAA regardless of the forum, or that 
Congress intended for these provisions to apply only to federal courts.  
Neither of these interpretations appears to be the most accurate reading of 
this statute, although both of these alternative readings lead to more sensible 
results.   
                                                 
145 9 U.S.C. § 9; McNeil et al., supra note 141. 
146 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
147 Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 
(1989). 
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The conclusion that §§ 9-11 of the FAA have some, or even complete, 
preemptive effect, whether in state and federal court or only in federal court, 
is not precluded by prior Supreme Court precedence holding that the FAA 
does not completely preempt state arbitration law.  The Supreme Court has 
held that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it 
reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”148  
However, this broad, sweeping language refers only to the substantive 
provisions of the FAA dealing with how arbitration provisions are enforced, 
not with judicial enforcement of rulings after arbitration has been held.149  
Commentators have referred to this distinction as the “front end” and “back 
end” of arbitration.150  The U.S. Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged 
that such a distinction is relevant, as the pre-emptive effect of the statute 
need not be determined by the statute as a whole; the analysis can and should 
be done on a provision by provision basis.151 
The Texas Supreme Court relied heavily on the Volt opinion in 
determining that the FAA did not preempt the result in Nafta Traders.  
However, Volt was also a “front end” arbitrability claim.  In that case, the 
Supreme Court took great care to point out that it involved enforcing the 
parties’ agreement with respect to how they could arbitrate their claims and 
that their choice to use state law rather than the FAA was not in conflict with 
the policies of the FAA.152  However, the policies undergirding the FAA 
which were discussed in that case were entirely different than the policies 
expressed by the Court in Hall Street with respect to judicial review.  If the 
purpose of the FAA with respect to judicial review truly is to create a 
“national policy” favoring limited judicial review,153 it is not at all clear that 
                                                 
148 Id. at 477 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)). 
149Id.    
150 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 
417 (2004) (“At one end of the continuum, state laws that deal with ‘front end’ issues (the 
agreement to arbitrate and the arbitrability of a dispute) and ‘back end’ issues (modification, 
confirmation, and vacatur of awards) are most likely to be preempted.”); Stephen L. Hayford, 
Federal Preemption and Vacatur:  The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 74-75.  While we disagree with Professor Drahozal’s 
conclusions with respect to likelihood of preemption, the distinction between “front end” and 
“back end” issues is important and relevant.   
151 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. The Supreme Court acknowledged that “While we have held that the 
FAA’s ‘substantive’ provisions - §§ 1 and 2 – are applicable in state and federal court . . . we 
have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in 
federal court . . . are nonetheless applicable in state court.” Id. (citations omitted).  There is no 
reason that this same reasoning cannot apply to each provision of the FAA with respect to 
preemption.  It is certainly within the power of Congress to pass a law which preempts 
(whether express implied) certain portions, but not others, of state law on the subject being 
regulated. 
152 Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79. 
153 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). 
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the policies and reasoning discussed in Volt and other preemption cases 
discussing these “front end” preemption issues are even relevant to the 
preemption analysis in cases involving the “back end” issue of judicial 
review.  
Ultimately, when the U.S. Supreme Court addresses a case on this issue, 
the result will be determined by whether the Court takes a more policy-based 
approach or textualist approach to the interpretation of the statute and its 
preemptive effect.  The make-up of the Court has changed since the ruling in 
the Hall Street decision, but five of the justices in the majority from Hall 
Street are still on the Court as of the time of this writing.  However, further 
changes to the Court may occur by the time this issue comes before it. The 
optimal result would be for the Court to take a more policy-based approach, 
and rule that parties can indeed contract for enforcement of any arbitration 
award under the state law of their choice and that the FAA does not preempt 
such a result.  This result gives parties more contractual options with respect 
to how their agreements will be enforced, providing them with valuable 
flexibility.  However, given the result and method of analysis utilized in Hall 
Street, it is far from clear that the result reached in Nafta Traders and other 
state courts will be followed by the U.S. Supreme Court when it finally 
addresses this important issue. 
 
C. International Dimensions 
 
While a full treatment of the subject is outside the scope of this Article, 
it bears noting that the issue of preemption is further obfuscated when 
international dimensions are considered.  The United States has adopted the 
Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958 
(hereinafter the “New York Convention”), which governs the enforceability 
of international commercial arbitration awards.154  An arbitration award falls 
under the New York Convention when it involves a legal relationship that is 
considered commercial and either one or more of the parties is not a United 
States citizen or the relationship “involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation 
with one or more foreign states.”155  The scope of this provision applying the 
New York Convention is quite broad, and thus the New York Convention 
could potentially apply to two United States citizens who have arbitrated 
domestically with respect to an international issue.  
In spite of the fact that the New York Convention was adopted over 
forty years ago, commentators have noted that “there is still an absence of 
                                                 
154 9 U.S.C. § 201.   
155 9 U.S.C. § 202.   
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consensus on the application of the Convention.”156  Although domestic 
courts have been consistent in the application of the New York Convention 
to arbitrations conducted abroad for which enforcement is sought in the 
United States, courts have been less consistent in their application of the New 
York Convention to international arbitrations conducted domestically.157  
While the terms of the FAA clearly apply the New York Convention to 
international arbitrations conducted within the United States, domestic courts 
have still often applied Chapter 1 of the FAA (relating to domestic 
arbitrations) rather than applying the New York Convention via Chapter 2.158 
This confusion and inconsistency in the application of the New York 
Convention adds an extra layer of problems to the domestic issues with 
preemption already discussed.  For example, suppose two United States 
citizens have a contractual dispute regarding international property, and the 
terms of the contract require arbitration of the dispute within the United 
States.  Further, suppose that the parties have contracted for application of 
Texas law to apply to the contract, exclusive enforcement under the TAA, 
and expanded judicial review.  A court, whether state or federal, would have 
three potential standards of judicial review to apply – Chapter 1 of the FAA, 
the New York Convention via Chapter 2 of the FAA (which may or may not 
allow for expanded judicial review),159 or the expanded judicial review 
contracted for by the parties via the TAA.  In this situation, the issue of 
preemption is once again critical to whether the parties will receive the 
expanded judicial review in their contract.   
Under its express terms, it appears that Chapter 2 of the FAA should 
apply, which requires enforcement of the award under the New York 
Convention.  The language of Chapter 2 with respect to the bases for review 
is mandatory, like that of Chapter 1, and states that courts “shall” confirm 
unless there is a ground for refusal under the New York Convention.160  If the 
                                                 
156 Richard W. Hulbert, The Case for a Coherent Application of Chapter 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 45 (2011). 
157 Id. 
158 Id.at 46 (“In a nutshell, the principal source of the difficulties is the continued insistence by 
some, though not all, federal courts that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the now 
venerable legislation enacted in 1925, still has an independent and decisive role to play in 
determining the legal effectiveness of an international award subject to the New York 
Convention of 1958, if that award is rendered in the United States.”). 
159 Heide Iravani and W. Michael Reisman, The Changing Relation of National Courts and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 19 (2010) (“The issue of 
whether parties should be able to contract for expanded judicial review once an award has 
been rendered is controversial within the world of commercial arbitration.”).   
160 9 U.S.C. § 207 (“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is 
made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter 
for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration.  The court shall 
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reasoning of Hall Street is applied to this provision and the bases for review 
under the New York Convention, then the result would be that expanded 
judicial review would not be allowed.  The question then is whether the 
reasoning of Hall Street should also be applied to the New York Convention.  
Since the bases for vacating an award under the New York Convention are 
relatively similar to those found in the FAA, if the parties are not allowed to 
have the expanded judicial review they contracted for, the result would 
essentially be the same as if the court had applied Chapter 1 of the FAA.161  
If the court decides that despite its terms Chapter 2 of the FAA does not 
apply, once again the issue of whether Chapter 1 of the FAA preempts 
enforcement under the TAA will determine whether expanded judicial 
review is allowed.    
 
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of the rulings in Hall Street and Nafta Traders and the 
resulting preemption issues are substantial for parties drafting arbitration 
agreements.  Due to the uncertainty of how the issue of preemption will be 
resolved, there is no “safe” course of action for contract drafters.  If parties 
attempt to be very thorough and precise in how they draft their arbitration 
agreement, they can potentially draft themselves into a corner, as discussed 
above.162  Parties may seek a safe harbor for the expanded judicial review 
that they desire by including both choice of law and forum selection clauses, 
but the forum selection clause may have the opposite of its intended effect 
and force application of the limited judicial review of the FAA.  Thus, how 
the arbitration agreement is drafted depends largely upon how the drafter 
feels this issue will be resolved by the Supreme Court. Given the 
schizophrenic nature of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on this issue, 
predicting how it will ultimately be resolved is difficult. 
In Texas and other states that have expressly stated that expanded 
judicial review by contract is allowable and not preempted by the FAA, the 
best course of action appears to be to draft the arbitration agreement with an 
express choice of law provision providing for exclusive enforcement under 
state arbitration law and a forum selection clause requiring that the award 
may only be enforced in that state’s court.  Such provisions are generally 
given effect, and can be used to prevent the enforcement action from ending 
up in federal court, where the preemption of the state law by the FAA is 
                                                                                                                   
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or 
enforcement of the award specified in said Convention.”).   
161 Irvani and Reisman, supra note 159 at 19 (noting that the bases for vacatur of the domestic 
award track those set forth in Article V of the New York Convention). 
162 See supra Part V. 
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more likely.  Courts in states like Texas which have rejected the Hall Street 
reasoning under state law are required to follow the precedent established by 
their own high court over any contrary federal precedent other than the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and thus the wishes of the parties will be followed unless 
and until the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
  
